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A Plea (and Proposal)
for Clarity and Fairness
Christopher H. Little*
The mechanics' lien law, which is of ancient origin in this
state, has been the subject of substantial but uncoordinated
amendments on several occasions .... [Tihere is and for many
years has been great uncertainty, among the members of the
legal profession in this state, as to the interpretation and ap-
plication of the statute. 1
INTRODUCTION
Unfortunately, this observation is equally applicable today as
it was more than sixty years ago. First enacted in 1847, Rhode
Island's current mechanics' lien law2 has experienced a long, fre-
quently amended history.3 It is now time for the Rhode Island
* Christopher Little is a principal of Little, Bulman & Reardon, P.C., a Prov-
idence-based law firm which concentrates its practice in the field of construction
law and construction litigation. He is the co-editor of the American Bar Associa-
tion's national survey of private construction laws, Construction and Design Law
(forthcoming Spring, 1998), and the author of the Rhode Island chapter. He was
assisted in the preparation of this Article by Fredrika Quinn Little, who is also an
attorney with Little, Bulman & Reardon, P.C.
1. Art Metal Constr. Co. v. Knight, 185 A. 136, 139 (R.I. 1936).
2. The 1847 Act was actually preceded by one passed in 1834, but the fore-
runner of today's Act superseded the earlier version.
3. In addition to general reenactments over time, the Rhode Island lien law,
since first enacted in 1834, The Mechanics' Lien Act of 1834, was amended in 1847,
1847 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 177 (hereinafter 1847 Act]; in 1888, 1888 R.I. Pub. Laws
ch. 696, §§ 1-4; in 1893, 1893 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1224, ch. 1, §§ 98-100; in 1896, R.I.
Gen. Laws ch. 206, §§ 1-23 (1896); in 1906, 1906 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1325, § 1; in
1909, R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 257, §§ 1-23 (1909); in 1923, 1923 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 460
(amending R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 301); in 1946, 1946 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1702, § 1
(amending R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 445, § 5); in 1956, 1956 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 3780, § 1
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General Assembly to consider substantial revisions to this statute,
rendering it more comprehensible to the practitioner and equitable
to the consumer. Rhode Island has an avowed liberal remedy
available to all who have contributed labor, material or equipment
towards the increased value of property.4 The statutory result is
an unduly burdensome scheme for an owner who can be required
to pay twice for work or materials and a trap for the hapless bona-
fide purchaser for value who acquires property that subsequently
can be liened. As for the poor contractor and his or her attorney,
one can only hope for the ability to read forward, backward and
virtually inside out as one tries to secure payment.
If all history is prologue, then perhaps a historical examina-
tion of the origins and development of the current mechanics' lien
law will help ascertain where Rhode Island should go, and possibly
glean a more direct route.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While the current mechanics' lien law rests on a statute
passed in 1847, that statute superseded an earlier act having much
simpler terms and concepts. The Mechanics' Lien Law of 18345
granted, subject to proper notice and perfection, a lien "for every-
thing which was used or went into the building, by whomsoever
furnished or supplied. It provide[d] for material men, tradesmen,
dealers in merchandise, who furnished no labor and contracted for
(amending R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 446, § 5); in 1959, 1959 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 89, § 1
(amending R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-11); in 1965, 1965 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 235, § 1
(amending R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 34-28-1 to -36); in 1966, 1966 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 197,
§§ 1-5 (amending R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 34-28-4, -6, -7, -17, -34); in 1981, 1981 R.I. Pub.
Laws chs. 356, § 1 (amending R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-1), 364, § 1 (amending R.I.
Gen. Laws § 34-28-4); in 1986, 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 331, § 5 (amending R.I.
Gen. Laws § 34-28-5); in 1989, 1989 R.I. Pub. Laws chs. 189, 540; in 1990, 1990
R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 452, § 1 (amending R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-37); in 1991, 1991
R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 328, §§ 1-2 (amending R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 34-28-1 to -5, -7 to -11,
-13 to -17, -19, -21, -25), § 3 (adding R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 34-28-32.2, -16.2); and in
1997, 1997 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 361, § 1 (adding RI. Gen. Laws § 34-28-3.1).
4. See Roofing Concepts, Inc. v. Barry, 559 A.2d 1059, 1061 (R.I. 1989) (citing
Field & Slocomb v. Consolidated Mineral Water Co., 55 A. 757, 758 (R.I. 1903)).
5. "An act securing to Mechanics and others payment for their labor and
materials expended in erecting and repairing houses and other buildings, canals,
rail roads and turnpikes with their appurtenances." The Mechanics' Lien Act of
1834.
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none, as well as for the builder and laborer."6 Those other than the
prime contractor had thirty days to provide notice of having been
employed to provide material or labor.7 While there may have
been virtue in simplicity, the General Assembly saw differently
and crafted the forerunner of today's statute. As a result, Rhode
Island courts, as well as the General Assembly, have spent consid-
erable effort defining and redefining the law's terms, enlarging and
restricting its scope. On various occasions, the General Assembly
has also amended the procedural aspects of the law, adding to the
confusion over its implementation.
In terms of the protections afforded laborers, the principal dif-
ference between the 1834 Act and the 1847 Act was the latter's
exclusion of materialmen, since only those materials provided by
persons furnishing labor were covered.8 Subsequently, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court interpreted the statute to include only those
materials provided by persons furnishing labor under the prime
contract.9 The fact that only the original contractor could assert a
lien for materials was a significant objection to the statute.' 0
This objection, however, was not the only difficulty that arose.
The court was also called upon to determine exactly who was enti-
tled to a lien for labor. In 1873, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that a worker of the original contractor possessed a lien for
labor in his own right," provided that he had given notice to the
land owner.12 Subsequently, the court sustained a lien for a sub-
contractor as to both his and his employees' labor. 13 Ultimately,
however, the court drew the line and denied a lien to the worker of
a subcontractor. 14 A second objection to the 1847 Act, then, was
that one who did work for, or furnished labor to, a subcontractor
could not assert a lien in his own right.' 5
6. Sweet & Carpenter v. James, 2 R.I. 270, 288 (1852) (referring to The
Mechanics' Lien Act of 1834).
7. See The Mechanics' Lien Act of 1834 § 1.
8. See Sweet & Carpenter, 2 R.I. at 288.
9. See Hatch v. Faucher, 8 A. 543 (R.I. 1887) (emphasis added).
10. See Art Metal Constr. Co. v. Knight, 185 A. 136, 141 (R.I. 1936).
11. The pronoun "he" or "his" is employed only for semantic ease and is not
intended as gender specific.
12. See Kenyon v. Peckham, 10 R.I. 402 (1873).
13. See Hatch, 8 A. at 543-44.
14. See Morrison v. Whaley, 19 A. 330 (R.I. 1890) (basing its decision on statu-
tory provisions prior to the 1888 Amendments).
15. See Art Metal Constr. Co., 185 A. at 141-42.
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Other changes in the 1847 Act required prior written consent
of an owner before his interest could be pledged where a lessee or
an owner of less than a fee simple contracted for improvements. 16
The General Assembly also expanded and complicated procedural
provisions of the Act. 17 Notably, the Act imposed different time
requirements for contractors with written contracts' s and those
without,' 9 as well as for subcontractors, regardless of the existence
of a written agreement.20 Further, the General Assembly ex-
pressly preserved the right of a person whose lien was lost for fail-
ure to satisfy the Act's procedural requirements as to his claim
upon the party with whom the contract had been made or at whose
request the labor was performed or materials furnished. 21
It was not until 1888 that the General Assembly fashioned a
remedy to address the first objection. The General Assembly
struck all language from section one that had previously granted a
lien for materials only to the original contractor, and replaced it
with language regarding materials "furnished by any person."22
Sections two and three of the 1847 Act were similarly amended. 23
Thereafter, in 1893, the legislature attempted to clarify vari-
ous procedural provisions,24 primarily by splitting existing sec-
tions into more discreet topics. Thus, three new provisions
replaced section nine of the 1847 Act. The first provision ad-
dressed the petition to enforce the lien, dictating the requisite con-
tents as well as the time and place for filing.25 The second
provision required notice of a petition.26 Finally, the third provi-
sion established the contents and service of a citation to show
cause why the lien should not be allowed.27
In 1896, the General Assembly again modified the Act. A new
section thirteen28 broke out the cost provision from section ten of
16. 1847 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 177, §§ 2-3.
17. Id. §§ 4-12, 16.
18. Id. § 4.
19. See id. § 5.
20. See id. § 6.
21. Id. § 17.
22. 1888 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 696, § 1.
23. Id. §§ 2, 3.
24. See 1893 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1224 ch. 1, §§ 98-100.
25. Id. § 98.
26. Id. § 99.
27. Id. § 100.
28. R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 206, § 13 (1896).
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the 1847 Act, and section fourteen addressed filing provisions for
suits against a corporation.29 Furthermore, whereas the 1847 Act
had provided for a jury trial, the legislature removed that right in
the 1896 amendment.30 New sections were created addressing is-
sues of trial and proceedings on petition;31 decree of sale3 2 and ap-
plication of sale proceeds;33 and posting of bond by a master
directing such sale and application.3 4 The remaining provisions
essentially renumbered earlier sections including only minor lin-
guistic changes.3 5 The section of the 1847 Act which provided for
appeal3 6 was deleted entirely.
Workers waited until 1906, however, for the General Assem-
bly to address the second objection to the 1847 Act. In that session,
the legislature granted a lien to those who performed work for or
furnished labor to a subcontractor.3 7 At last, the mechanics' lien
provisions extended relief to the same parties and for the same la-
bor and services protected under the 1834 Act.
While pursuing modifications concerning parties, labor and
services, the General Assembly was also tinkering with various
procedural requirements.38 Because the law developed piecemeal,
notice requirements and time constraints did not carry any consis-
tency.3 9 Additionally, the legislature sought here to decrease and
there to increase the protections afforded. 4°
The twists and turns in the development of Rhode Island's law
are, of course, particular to this state. Rhode Island, however, is
29. Id. § 14.
30. Compare 1847 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 177, § 11 (providing for a jury upon re-
quest by the parties) with R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 206, § 15 (deleting the provision
which allowed for a jury).
31. R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 206, § 16.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 17.
34. Id. § 18.
35. Id. §§ 19-23.
36. 1847 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 177, § 18.
37. See 1906 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1325, § 1 (amending R.I. Gen Laws ch. 206,
§ 6 (1896)).
38. See Art Metal Constr. Co. v. Knight, 185 A. 136, 140-44 (R.I. 1936).
39. See 1991 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 328, § 1.
40. In 1906, for example, a lien was granted to one who performed work or
labor at the request of a contractor or subcontractor and covered such work or
labor for a period of 60 days next preceding the giving of requisite notice. See 1906
R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1325, § 1. In 1923, the period covered was only 40 days. See
R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 301, § 6 (1923). Now, it is 120 days. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-
9 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
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hardly unique in its reliance upon an arcane and often incoherent
statutory framework for protecting the interests of those who have
contributed labor, material or equipment towards the increased
value of property.
Maryland adopted the first mechanics' lien statute in 1791 at
the urging of the commission created to establish the City of Wash-
ington.41 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Penn-
sylvania also had adopted a mechanics' lien law.42 Thereafter, by
the start of the twentieth century, virtually all states had adopted
such laws. Initially, the statutes protected only persons who dealt
directly with an owner. However, over time, subcontractors and
materialmen persuaded many state legislatures, including Rhode
Island's, to provide coverage to suppliers and subcontractors who
had not been paid by the general contractor.
In many states, the lien of a subcontractor and supplier re-
mained limited to that amount due and payable to the general con-
tractor or the other party immediately above it in the contracting
chain. This approach, known as the New York System,43 is applied
today in approximately one half of the states.44 The more expan-
41. For a discussion of the history of the mechanics' lien law, see Moore-Mans-
field Constr. Co. v. Indianapolis New Castle & Toledo Railway Co., 101 N.E. 296,
301-02 (Ind. 1913). See Marion W. Benfield, Jr., The Uniform Construction Lien
Act: What, Whither and Why, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 527 (1992).
In a recent article, Richard Morneau quotes James Madison and Thomas Jef-
ferson, members of the commission, who urged the enactment of a law securing to
tradesmen a lien on the houses they erected and land occupied:
Your memorialists conceive it would encourage master builders to con-
tract for erection and furnishing of houses for certain prices agreed upon,
if a lien was created by law for their just claim on the house erected and
the lot of land on which it stood.
Richard N. Morneau, Mechanic's Liens: Traps for the Unwary, 18 R.I. Laws. Wkly.,
at 10 (Aug. 25, 1997).
42. See Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co., 101 N.E. at 301.
43. See Robert Kratovil & Raymond Werner, Modern Mortgage Law and Prac-
tice § 25.27, at 392 (2d ed. 1981).
44. The following states limit a subcontractor's and supplier's lien to the un-
paid portion owed the general contractor: Alabama, Ala. Code § 35-11-210 (1975 &
Supp. 1997); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 49-33(e), (f) (West 1994); Dela-
ware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 2702(a) (1989); District of Columbia, D.C. Code Ann.
§§ 38-103, -105 to -106 (1990 Replacement); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 713.06(1)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1998); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 44-14-361.1(e) (Supp. 1997);
Illinois, 770 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 60/21 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); Iowa, Iowa
Code Ann. § 572.14 (West 1992); Kansas, Kan. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 60-1103(d)
(West 1994); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 376.010(1) (Michie 1972 & Supp.
1996); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 3251 (West 1997); Massachusetts,
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sive approach, following the initial lead of Pennsylvania,45 pro-
vides a subcontractor with a direct lien against the owner,
regardless of the extent of the payments by the owner to the gen-
eral contractor. Rhode Island is among the states that apply the
Pennsylvania rule.46
There is surprisingly little uniformity among the states as to
procedures and terms of mechanics' lien laws. As stated by one
authority, "[elach law is a patchwork, a crazy quilt of amendments
lobbied through the state capitol to pull the teeth of court decisions
deemed unfavorable to some interest."47 Moreover, various com-
mentators have criticized the expansion of subcontractors' and
suppliers' rights as a consequence of the trades' lobbying of disor-
ganized state legislatures. These commentators bemoan the ab-
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, § 4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); Michigan, Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 570.102 (West 1996); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-131 (1972)
(1991 Revised); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 52-136 (1993); New York, N.Y. Lien
Law § 4 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1997-1998); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 44A-18 (1991); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code § 35-27-02 (1987); Oklahoma,
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 143 (West 1990); South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 29-5-
40 (Law Co-op. 1976) (1991 Revised); South Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws § 44-9-1
(Michie 1997); Texas, Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 53.024 (West 1995) and Virginia, Va.
Code Ann. § 43-7 (Michie 1950) (1994 Replacement).
45. See Kratovil & Werner, supra note 43 § 25.27, at 392 (referring to the
Pennsylvania system).
46. In addition to Rhode Island, the following states apply the traditional
Pennsylvania rule which gives subcontractors and suppliers a direct lien for the
entire amount of the claim: Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 34.35.050 (Michie 1996); Ari-
zona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-981(A) (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); Arkansas, Ark.
Code Ann. § 18-44-101 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1997); California, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3110 (West 1993); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101(2) (1997); Hawaii, Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 507-42 (1993); Idaho, Idaho Code § 45-501 (1997); Indiana, Ind. Code
Ann. § 32-8-3-1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1997); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 9:4802(A), (D) (West 1991); Maryland, Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 9-104 (1996
& Supp. 1997); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 514.01 (West); Missouri, Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 429.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); Montana, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 71-3-524,
-526 (1997); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 108.222(1)(a) (Michie 1994 & Supp.
1997); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 447:5 (1991); New Jersey, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:44A-3 (West Supp. 1997); New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-2-2 (Michie
1978) (1995 Replacement); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1311.02 (West 1994); Ore-
gon, Or. Rev. Stat. § 87.010 (1988); Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 49, § 1405
(West 1965); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-102 (1993); Vermont, Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 9, § 1921 (1993); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 60.04.021 (West
Supp. 1998); West Virginia, W. Va. Code §§ 38-2-2, -21 (1997); Wisconsin, Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 779.01(3) (West 1981) and Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-2-106(b)
(Michie 1997).
47. Kratovil & Werner, supra note 43, § 25.27, at 392.
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sence of an organized group of owners. 48 One response has been a
suggestion to create a uniform act applicable throughout the
country.
Beginning in the 1970s, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (National Conference) proposed the
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act (USLTA), which in-
cluded a section for mechanics' liens.49 The USLTA was resound-
ingly unsuccessful, and only Nebraska adopted, with
modifications, the construction lien article as a free-standing act.50
In 1987, the National Conference developed the Uniform Construc-
tion Lien Act (UCLA)51 from the USLTA. 52 The UCLA was like-
wise not well received, although different states have adopted
pieces of the UCLA in recent years.53
A principal objection to the UCLA is attributable directly to its
statement of purposes. Section 101 of the UCLA asserts that the
Act's underlying purpose is to further the security and certainty of
land titles and to create uniformity with respect to mechanic's
liens law.54 Unlike most state laws, including that of Rhode Is-
land, the UCLA contained no clear statement protecting those who
furnish labor and materials to construction projects.55
48. See id.; Justin Sweet, Legal Aspects of Architecture, Engineering and the
Construction Process § 24.07, at 468 (2d ed. 1977).
49. Unif. Simplification of Land Transfers Act, prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 249
(1990).
50. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 52-125 to -159 (1993).
51. Unif. Construction Lien Act, 7 U.L.A. 381 (1987).
52. See id. at 381.
53. See Benfield, supra note 41, at 567 (referring to Nebraska, Michigan, Ohio
and Texas adopting portions of the UCLA).
54. See Steven M. Siegfried & Stanley P. Sklar, Overview of the Uniform Con-
struction Lien Act, 10 Constr. Law. 13 (1990) (referring to the UCLA §§ 101(a)(3),
(4), 7 U.L.A., at 394).
55. Section 101 of the UCLA reads as follows:
§ 101. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Scope.
(a) This [Act] shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies, which are:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing con-
struction liens;
(2) to provide procedures for the protection of persons fur-
nishing services and materials for real estate improvements;
(3) to further the security and certainty of land titles; and
(4) to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this
[Act] among states enacting it.
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Although the National Conference drafted the UCLA with the
expectation that it would accommodate the interests of all parties
to the construction process and lead to uniformity of mechanics'
lien laws across the country, such has not been the case. One
prominent commentator has noted that the UCLA's intended goal
of uniformity is not likely to be met due to "the variable political
climate in the various states; particularly varying political
strengths of parties in the construction process which have oppos-
ing interests."56 In addition, the UCLA has met strong opposition
from the construction community, particularly those involved as
subcontractors and suppliers. Criticizing the assertion that the
UCLA answers problems in a realistic manner, these opponents
have argued:
We agree that they operate in a realistic manner, but we
question in whose favor the realism flows. It is our opinion
that the realism flows not to the contractor but to the lender
and owner. One could debate ad nauseum who is more im-
portant, i.e., the lender without whose funds the project could
not be completed or the contractor without whose skill the
project could not be constructed. The fact is that both parties
are necessary ingredients and that an accommodation should
be reached between both of these parties in order to realize a
fair act.57
Even a cursory review of the lien laws of the various states
reveals a remarkable degree of variety in terminology, time tables
and procedures. 58 These inconsistencies among the states, while
providing a logical justification for a uniform system, are a result
of local practice, custom and individual legislative choices and
have been difficult to overcome. The experience with the UCLA
seems to establish that uniformity's potential benefits are out-
weighed by the political process which retains its responsiveness to
such local pressures, customs and dynamics. Even some UCLA
proponents now recognize the apparent futility in seeking major
(b) This [Act] creates, and provides for the attachment and en-
forceability of, a lien against real estate in favor of a person furnish-
ing services or materials under a real estate improvement contract.
Unif. Construction Lien Act, 7 U.L.A., at 397.
56. Benfield, supra note 41, at 570.
57. Siegfried & Sklar, supra note 54, at 20.
58. For a general discussion of various state provisions, see 5 C. Allen Foster
et al., Construction and Design Law § 37 (1991 and Supp. 1997).
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substantive and procedural changes which would be the inelucta-
ble consequence of achieving uniformity. The observation of Pro-
fessor Marion Benfield, a reporter-drafter in the efforts of the
National Conference, may accurately depict the future of the
UCLA: "For the most part, the UCLA is likely to be viewed, at the
least, as a parts warehouse from which parts which fit a particular
state's existing statute and its political climate can be extracted."59
THE MASSACHUSETTS MESSAGE
In looking for other spare parts to repair Rhode Island's tat-
tered lien law, one should look beyond the UCLA to the exper-
iences of other states. Massachusetts presents a particularly good
place to start. In 1996, the Massachusetts legislature enacted the
most substantial reforms to its mechanics' lien laws since 1915.60
These amendments were the result of years of negotiations involv-
ing contractors, subcontractors, developers, owners, bankers, title
insurers and organized labor. One commentator has written:
"[Tihe drafters intended to make the lien law fulfill its promise as a
contractor's security for payment, to simplify the process of record-
ing the lien and to enhance the fairness and certainty of the law for
all affected constituencies."6' The Massachusetts legislature
learned from the mistake of the UCLA, and "[niothing in the new
law changes the basic purpose of the mechanic's lien statute;
rather the changes are intended to give meaning to its true
purpose."62
Of particular pertinence to Rhode Island are the provisions in
the new Massachusetts law which provide procedure for "non-hos-
tile" lien notices by general contractors and a statutory restriction
on a lender's ability to refuse to fund over such notice, provided
certain procedural requirements are met. The law establishes new
procedures for owners and contractors to work with lenders so that
liens can be released or subordinated in an orderly and non-con-
frontational manner to facilitate funding of projects.63
59. Benfield, supra note 41, at 569.
60. See A Practical Approach to Mechanics Liens, MCLE (Massachusetts Con-
tinuing Legal Education, Boston, MA) 1996.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 254, § 32 (West Supp. 1997).
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Massachusetts thus has joined a number of states that recog-
nize the importance of providing an owner with actual or construc-
tive knowledge of all potential claims. While lienors in privity with
the owner are generally not subject to pre-lien notification require-
ments because the owner has obvious knowledge of their involve-
ment in the project, such is often not the case with respect to
subcontractors, or in particular, suppliers and remote subcontrac-
tors. The reasons for providing pre-lien notice are obvious. An
owner not in privity with a potential lienor may be unaware of the
work performed or the materials supplied, or just who is providing
value to the real property. This lack of knowledge of potential lien-
ors can work to the detriment of the lienor as well as the owner.
Pre-lien notice serves to inform owners of the existence and status
of a creditor's potential claims. Thus, states that require pre-lien
notice generally ensure that such notice is provided much earlier
than the time within which the notice of the lien is to be filed.64
States may require the filing of the pre-lien notice prior to furnish-
ing the labor and materials, 65 within a certain number of days af-
ter first furnishing labor and materials, 66 or not later than a
certain number of days prior to filing of the lien.67
The new Massachusetts provision recognizes commercial real-
ity. In the general commercial setting, the owner, through the gen-
eral contractor, may not need a pre-lien notice from all
subcontractors inasmuch as the owner has measures through
which it can receive actual or constructive notice of those subcon-
tractors who are working on the project. The Massachusetts law
previously authorized the filing of a notice of contract. That provi-
sion, however, was commonly considered to be a "notice of con-
flict"68 because, upon the filing of a notice of contract, a lender
would generally stop payment even if no actual conflict on the pro-
ject existed. As a consequence, a notice of contract would usually
64. Foster et al., supra note 58, § 37.4A, at 41.
65. See Ala. Code § 35-11-210 (1975) (1991 Replacement); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
42, § 142.1 (West 1990).
66. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-992.01(a)-(c) (1990); Cal. Civ. Code
§§ 3097(a)-(b),(d) and 3114 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 713.06(2)(a) (West Supp. 1998); Ind. Code Ann. § 32-8-3-1 (West 1979 & Supp.
1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 60.04.031 (West Supp. 1998).
67. See Ark. Code Ann. § 18-44-114(a) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1997); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 38-22-109(3) (1997); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 429.100 (West 1992); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 29-2-107 (Michie 1997).
68. See A Practical Approach to Mechanics Liens, supra note 60, at 12.
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not be filed unless a payment dispute was pending.69 The Massa-
chusetts legislature addressed the legitimate concerns of lenders
about maintaining their priorities for advances made subsequent
to the filing of a notice of contract. The legislature provided protec-
tion for the priority of a lender who had made a payment subject to
receipt of a partial waiver and subordination form executed in ac-
cordance with statutory requirements. v0 Specifically, the new stat-
ute prevents a lender from withholding payment for the sole
reason that a notice of contract has been filed.7 1
Under the new Massachusetts framework, the recording of a
notice of contract is now considered a "non-hostile and expected
event on every project."72 The Massachusetts law now specifically
requires lower-tier subcontractors, suppliers and vendors to serve
a notice of identification on the general contractor. 73 Under prior
Massachusetts practice and the current practice in Rhode Island, a
second-, third- or fourth-tier subcontractor or supplier could come
out of the woodwork late in the process. Under the new Massachu-
setts law, however, a lower-tier subcontractor must provide formal
notice to the general contractor in order to protect his lien rights.74
Of significant importance to the Massachusetts practitioner
has been the elimination of much of the disjointed provisions of the
prior statute. In sum, the Massachusetts legislature has largely
rewritten its construction lien law. 75
WHERE Do WE START WITH THE RHODE IsLAND LAw?
The statutory provisions suggested in this Article deserve the
attention of all parties involved in Rhode Island's construction in-
dustry--owners, 76 contractors, subcontractors, insurance and
bank representatives, attorneys, architects and engineers-as well
as members of the General Assembly. The goal is twofold: to sim-
69. See A Practical Approach to Mechanics Liens, supra note 60, at 13.
70. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 254, § 32 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
71. See id. § 33.
72. See A Practical Approach to Mechanics Liens, supra note 60 at 12.
73. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 254, § 4.
74. See id.
75. Compare id. § 1 with R.L Gen. Laws § 34-28-1 (1956) (1995 Reenactment)
(maintaining the arcane language of Rhode Island law).
76. References to "owner" are intended to include "tenant or lessee" as well as
'owner of less than freehold" as covered by §§ 34-28-1 to -3 of the Rhode Island
General Laws.
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plify and clarify the law in order to protect the interests of all and
to maintain consistency with the basic thrust of Rhode Island law
since 1847. Toward those ends, the procedures adopted should be
readily comprehensible and conform with general civil litigation
practices.
The first place to start is by considering the intended purpose
of the mechanics' lien law, which is nothing other than to provide
protection for those parties whose services increase the value of
realty. In effect, the law provides these parties with an interest in
the property akin to a mortgage. In both instances, the land is
held responsible for the debt in the nature of an in rem proceed-
ing,77 which does not preclude an in personam claim.78
The second consideration is to determine whose interests are
at stake and a delineation of their concerns. Clearly, the interests
of workers and suppliers, be they original or subcontractors, war-
rant paramount concern. Certainly, workers and suppliers desire
and deserve full payment. The lender, however, must ensure that
work is performed before loan proceeds may be disbursed and does
not want to be caught in crossfire between adverse parties. The
owner presumably wants the project completed lien free. Owners,
particularly those of residential dwellings, understandably object
to the idea of paying twice for the same work. A bona-fide pur-
chaser for value has no interest in incurring liens for which there
was no notice. Others with property interests expect their rights to
be respected as well.
Any reform must address the arcane language which is per-
haps at its worst typified in section 34-28-5 of the Rhode Island
General Laws.79 At the outset, let it be said: Woe to the gramma-
rian who seeks to diagram the first sentence of that section. The
linguistic difficulty in this section is only the beginning of the prob-
lem. A statute which has its origins in the nineteenth century and
has been the subject to numerous amendments over the years can-
not be expected to be coherent. The Rhode Island statute does not
exceed even these minimal expectations.
77. See Hunt v. Darling, 59 A. 398 (R.I. 1904).
78. See Tilcon Gammino, Inc. v. Commercial Assocs., 570 A.2d 1102 (R.I.
1990).
79. Section 34-28-5 concerns the notice requirements for a party intending to
claim a lien.
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FROM THE BEGINNING
For years, legal lore has held that Rhode Island's mechanics
lien law grants a right to all contractors, subcontractors, suppliers,
architects or engineers to file a lien against the property they im-
prove. It is true that this lore is not literally consistent with the
language of section 34-28-1(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws.80
In Myles P. Flaherty Associates v. Russo,8 1 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court rejected lore, in favor of law. The court held that a
supplier of materials used to construct an improvement to property
could not perfect a mechanic's lien. The court reasoned that there
was no agreement made by the owner with anyone to construct any
improvement since at all times the owner intended to construct the
improvements himself. Myles Flaherty Associates had supplied
materials to Steel Roof Systems, which had delivered the materials
to the property through a North Carolina-based trucking firm.
Under these circumstances, the court held that the owner of the
property had not agreed with the supplier of the materials to fur-
nish or deliver them for purposes of improving the property.
One could argue that the owner impliedly consented by virtue
of his receipt and use of the steel that Myles Flaherty delivered to
the Russo residence. The decision is difficult to reconcile with prior
Rhode Island Supreme Court holdings. The court has generally
recognized that, when placing the burden of expense on two indi-
viduals who are generally blameless, it will give first preference to
the party providing the labor or material.8 2 The decision may also
superficially conflict with the long-established concepts that the
80. Section 34-28-1(a) provides:
Whenever any building, canal, turnpike, railroad, or other improvement
shall be constructed, erected, altered, or repaired by oral or written con-
tract with or at the oral or written request of the owner, the owner being
at the time the owner of the land on which the improvement is located, or
by the husband of such owner with the consent of his wife, the building,
canal, turnpike, railroad, or other improvement, together with the land, is
hereby made liable and shall stand subject to liens for all the work done
by any person in the construction, erection, alteration or reparation of
such building, canal, turnpike, railroad, or other improvement, and for
the materials used in the construction, erection, alteration, or reparation
thereof, which have been furnished by any person.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-1(a).
81. 685 A.2d 663 (R.I. 1996).
82. See Faraone v. Faraone, 413 A.2d 90 (R.I. 1980).
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statute is intended to afford a liberal remedy to all who have con-
tributed labor or material adding to the value of real property. 83
Yet, consider the bases underlying a mechanic's lien. A pre-
requisite to the existence of a valid mechanic's lien is the implied
or express consent of the owner to the furnishing of labor or mater-
ials or both. Express written contracts are not typically required.
Generally, most state courts, like Rhode Island's, hold that implied
or oral contracts are sufficient. 84 Most mechanics' lien laws, how-
ever, require something more than inactive or passive consent by
the owner. Mere knowledge by the owner that labor and materials
have been or are being furnished to improve the property is gener-
ally insufficient.8 5 Even the states with the most expansive lien
laws require knowledge on the part of the owner that a particular
party is furnishing labor and/or materials to the project. Often, the
issue of notice extends not simply to the fact that labor or materi-
als are being provided, but extends to the identity of the person
who is providing the labor or materials to the project.86 In this
light, the reasoning underlying the holding in Myles Flaherty be-
comes lucid. The Russos had an obvious inability even to know the
identity of Myles Flaherty Associates and its potential involvement
with their project. The Russos' plight is similar to that faced often
in Rhode Island even by those prudent owners who unsuccessfully
try to protect themselves from mechanics' liens asserted by lower-
tier suppliers or subcontractors.
On a typical project, an owner may engage a general contrac-
tor who in turn enters into agreements with subcontractors. Many
of those subcontractors may issue agreements to suppliers and/or
their own subcontractors. While an owner can protect him or her-
self from a contractor's lien, and perhaps from the liens of promi-
nent direct subcontractors and suppliers, other subcontractors and
suppliers frequently do not appear on the construction-site radar.
At times, it can be virtually impossible for the owner to be certain
83. See, e.g., Roofing Concepts, Inc. v. Barry, 559 A.2d 1059 (R.I. 1989).
84. See, e.g., Turnkey Constructors, Inc. v. Dewey, Cheatum & Howe, Inc., 341
So. 2d 1339, 1340-41 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Schaefer v. Lampert Lumber Co., 591
P.2d 1225, 1227 (Wyo. 1979).
85. See, e.g., Wilbur Smith & Assocs. v. F & J, Inc., 382 A.2d 541, 543 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1977); Miles Holmes v. Harrah Plumbing and Heating Serv. Co., 408
N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
86. See generally Foster et. al., supra note 58, at § 37.3(d) (stating that iden-
tity of a lower-tier party is important because of the extension of lien rights).
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that everyone has been paid. A supplier to a second-tier subcon-
tractor may seek to assert a lien due to lack of payment-a condi-
tion over which the owner may have little redress, and likely little
knowledge. If the company that supplies lumber to the lumber
yard that sells lumber to the subcontractor who works for the gen-
eral contractor is not paid, then how can the owner know? The
Supreme Court's holding in Myles Flaherty is one response. Yet,
the holding by itself has added much to the consternation and con-
fusion of construction-law practitioners.
Several avenues exist through which difficulties created by
Myles Flaherty can be addressed. One logical response is to man-
date the recording of a notice of intention by any person who does
not have a direct contract with the owner or a direct contract with
a contractor to the owner. Rhode Island law envisions a notice of
intention that may be recorded to provide notice that the party will
be providing materials or labor to the project. Under current prac-
tice, however, lenders are unlikely to advance funds upon record-
ing of a notice of intention for fear that doing so will cause
subsequent payments to lose priority to the person filing notice.
Rhode Island is now in the same position as Massachusetts prior to
its recent amendments-there is no clear procedure to accommo-
date the interests of both lenders and mechanics' lienors short of
dissolution of the mechanic's lien. As a consequence, a notice of
intention is effectively a notice of conflict.8 7 With modifications to
87. Massachusetts has provided comfort to lenders by stating:
Except with respect to any construction project containing or designed to
contain at least one but not more than four dwelling units, the filing or
recording of documents claiming a lien under section two, or the filing or
recording of a statement pursuant to section eight in furtherance of a lien
arising pursuant to section one, shall not itself be grounds for a mortgagee
to withhold sums for the funding, financing or payment for the labor or
labor and materials for which any such notice or statement is filed or re-
corded or to require dissolution of such notice or statement before provid-
ing further funding, financing or payments, and any covenant, promise,
agreement or understanding relative to the improvement or alteration to
real property to withhold such funding, financing or payment to require
dissolution of such notice or statement before providing further funding,
financing or payments solely on that ground is against public policy and
void and unenforceable; provided, however, that nothing contained in this
chapter shall obligate a mortgagee to disburse sums for the funding, fi-
nancing or payment for the labor or labor and materials for which any
such notice or statement is filed or recorded unless such mortgagee has
received an accurately completed and valid partial waiver and subordina-
tion of lien in the form set forth in clause (3) of section thirty-two from the
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person who filed or recorded such notice or statement; provided, further
that nothing in this chapter shall, in any manner limit or restrict the
right of any mortgagee to withhold any and all sums for the funding, fi-
nancing, or payment for labor or labor and materials based upon: (a) the
failure of the owner to comply with any other terms, conditions or require-
ments in any agreement providing for the funding of the loan, the repay-
ment of the loan or any mortgage securing any such agreement or (b) the
filing or recording of documents claiming a lien under section four if the
right to withhold is contained in any agreement providing for the funding
of the loan, the repayment of the loan, or any mortgage securing such
agreement, except that such right to withhold shall not be effective to bar
the filing of notice of contract or the taking of any steps to enforce a lien.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 254, § 33 (West Supp. 1997).
The form required under Section 33 is the form of Partial Waiver and Subordi-
nation of Lien:
Partial Waiver and Subordination of Lien
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS: Date:




1. Original Contract Amount: $
2. Approved Change Orders: $
3. Adjusted Contract Amount $
(line 1 plus 2)
4. Completed to Date: $
5. Less Retainage: $
6. Total Payable to Date: $
(line 4 less line 5)
7. Less Previous Payment: $
8. Current Amount Due: $
(line 6 less line 7)
9. Pending Change Orders: $
10. Disputed Claims: $
The undersigned who has a contract with
for furnishing labor or materials or both labor and materials or rental equipment,
appliances or tools for the erection, alteration, repair or removal of a building or
structure or other improvement of real property known and identi-
fied as
located in (city or town), County, Common-
wealth of Massachusetts and owned by , upon receipt of
($ _) in payment of an invoice/requisition/application for payment
dated does hereby:
(a) waive any and all liens and right of lien on such real property for labor
or materials, or both labor and materials, or rental equipment, appliances or
tools, performed or furnished through the following date:
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fit Rhode Island's statutory scheme, the Massachusetts response
certainly could work in this state, particularly on commercial
projects.
THE RESIDENTIAL CONTEXT
Many states address the Myles Flaherty conundrum with spe-
cial requirements for residential construction. In Delaware, for ex-
ample, if a contractor has received full or final payment made in
good faith and has given the owner a verified written certification
that everyone has been paid, then it is not possible thereafter for a
party to obtain a mechanic's lien on the property.8 8 The law of
Michigan protects the owner or lessee of a residential structure
from the requirement of paying twice for contracted improvements
by virtue of the establishment of a homeowner's construction lien
recovery fund.8 9 That fund is established through contractors' i-
censure fees and provides recovery up to $75,000 for each residen-
tial structure. 90 The Michigan Department of Licensing and
Regulation is subrogated to the rights of each person to whom a
fund payment is made.9 1 A simpler alternative, adopted by some
other states, is to require residential subcontractors and/or those
parties lower on the construction tier, in order to preserve lien
rights, to issue the owner a notice that he is providing labor or
materials.9 2 Any late notice may still be valid to protect the sub-
(payment period), except for retainage, unpaid agreed or pending change or-
ders, and disputed claims as stated above; and
(b) subordinate any and all liens and right of lien to secure payment for
such unpaid, agreed or pending change orders and disputed claims, and such
further labor or materials, or both labor and materials, or rental equipment,
appliances or tools, except for retainage, performed or furnished at any time
through the twenty-fifth day after the end of the above payment period, to the
extent of the amount actually advanced by the above lender/mortgagee
through such twenty-fifth day.
Signed under the penalties of perjury this day of
The giving of partial waiver and subordination of lien by any contractor under this
section shall not affect the lien rights of any other person claiming a lien under any
section of this chapter.
Id. at § 32.
88. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 2707 (1989).
89. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 570.1201 (1996).
90. See id. § 570.1204.
91. See id. § 570.1205(2).
92. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 3255(3) (West 1997); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 29-5-40 (Law Co-op. 1991).
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contractor, although to a limited extent,93 e.g., if the owner has not
yet paid the contractor.
In residential and commercial projects alike, the owner may
all too frequently find himself paying more than once for the same
work. Even the most prudent owner or lender cannot avoid this
possibility. The General Assembly could readily advance construc-
tion interests by requiring that a party, whose specific involvement
in the project is likely unknown to the owner, directly notify the
owner of his involvement. If, in that event, the owner continues to
avail himself of the benefit of the labor and materials provided,
then the General Assembly should consider such to be in accord-
ance with "an oral or written contract with or at the oral or written
request of the owner."94
How TO PROVE THE AMOUNT OF THE LIEN
Having been born a century before the adoption of the rules of
civil procedure and lived as a distant and unfamiliar cousin since,
the statutory framework for the proof of a lien is a hybrid mush of
inconsistencies. The starting place for reform here lies in changing
the pleading and process mandated by the statute.95
The requirements of section 34-28-13 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws relative to the contents of the petition to enforce do not
differ significantly from similar requirements that are required rel-
ative to the preparation of a complaint in a civil action. Yet, upon
filing of the petition, all resemblance with customary pleading and
process comes to an end. When the petition to enforce is filed, the
mechanic's lien process reverts to the nineteenth century. Section
34-28-14 sets forth the duties of the clerk of the superior court
upon the filing of a petition. The clerk shall advertise the petition,
93. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-992.01(E) (West 1990).
94. R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-1 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
95. After the pleading and process stage, the action should proceed in accord-
ance with a normal civil action. Rule 81 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules
of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
Applicability of Rules. - (a) To What Proceedings Applicable.
(1) These rules do not apply during the process and pleading stages to the
following proceedings: ... [pletitions for enforcement of mechanics' liens.
R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 81.
Similarly, section 34-28-16.2 of the Rhode Island General Laws provides that, "af-
ter the filing with the court of all claims pursuant to § 34-28-16, the proceeding
shall continue pursuant to the rules of civil procedure, in a nonjury proceeding."
R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-16.2 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
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together with the "return date" set pursuant to section 34-28-15,
once in a newspaper of general circulation. This advertisement no-
tifies all persons with an interest in the property to appear on the
return date and show cause why the mechanic's lien should not be
enforced for the amount claimed. 96 Section 34-28-14 also requires
the clerk to issue citations, to be served by the sheriff, on all inter-
ested parties listed on the petition informing them of the need to
come forward and show cause. The sheriff must serve these cita-
tions on the parties at least ten days prior to the date set as the
return date. Pursuant to section 34-28-16, all parties asserting a
lien must file an account and demand, and parties with an encum-
brance other than a lien must file a claim. Although the statute
sets forth specific service requirements in section 34-28-15, the pe-
tition itself is not required to be served upon the parties in
interest.
The consequence of this procedure is confusion. There is no
show-cause hearing, and there is no return date for anyone to ap-
pear, contrary to the language of the statute. Moreover, the spe-
cial process of requiring the clerk to issue a citation, instead of
allowing the customary issuance of a summons, may result in un-
due complexity. In Frank N. Gustafson & Sons, Inc. v. Walek, 97
the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a superior court deci-
sion dismissing the lien where the court clerk had failed to issue a
citation for the property owner and the contractor's counsel did not
recognize the clerk's error.9 The contractor did not serve the
owner before the return date. Even though the owner obviously
had actual notice of the proceeding as evidenced by his motion to
dismiss filed just four days after the citation should have been
served, the superior court granted the motion. The superior court
believed that under the literal language of the statute, it had no
discretion to do otherwise. In reversing, the supreme court recog-
nized the cumbersome nature of the statute, reasoning that "to ob-
ligate every petitioner to ensure that the clerk's office satisfactorily
performs its statutory duties would be unduly burdensome." 99
96. R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-14. The return date, contrary to the language of
the statute, has little contemporary significance. There is no show-cause proceed-
ing on that date.
97. 599 A.2d 730 (R.I. 1991).
98. See id.
99. Id. at 732.
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The original purpose of the statutory framework in providing
for a return date and show-cause process was to give a claimant a
summary remedy without the delay of further pleadings.100 Inas-
much as the rules of civil procedure now expressly apply to all
mechanic's lien proceedings after the pleading and process
stage,' 0 ' this goal can no longer be achieved and the existing notice
and service process serves no readily identifiable purpose. The
need for citations and advertising unduly increase the cost of the
process without adding to notice or aiding the parties. The unu-
sual process engenders confusion among all who have long become
accustomed to the processes of the rules of civil procedure.
A second source of statutory confusion may arise pertaining to
multiple lien claims. Section 34-28-18, which pertains to the con-
solidation of proceedings, is at best superfluous and at worst con-
fusing, when construed in light of its counterparts under the rules
of civil procedure. 10 2
The statute and the rules explicitly state that the rules of civil
procedure govern all mechanic's lien actions following the pleading
stage. As presently drafted, however, the statute continues to in-
clude the common-law provisions for proving a lien. Thus, these
terms are inconsistent with the rules.' 03 Massachusetts'0 4 and
100. See Burlingame & Co. v. Emerson, 5 R.I. 62 (1857).
101. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 81.
102. Section 34-28-18 of the Rhode Island General Laws reads as follows:
If more than one petition under §§ 34-28-10 and 34-28-13 are filed against
the same or any part of the same property, like proceedings shall be had
on each, and each petitioner shall give upon motion of any person inter-
ested in the petition made at any time, surety for costs, unless he or she is
an inhabitant of the state; but all such petitions against the same or any
part of the same property shall be consolidated after the returns of the
citations and shall proceed as one.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-18. Cf. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3)(ii) (describing the
procedure with respect to a motion to consolidate cases for trial); id. 12(b)(7) (fail-
ure to join an indispensable party); id. 19 (joinder of persons needed for just
adjudication).
103. Section 34-28-21 of the Rhode Island General Laws, which pertains to a
decree ordering sale, is particularly apt in this respect. It was obviously originally
drafted to provide guidance to the superior court, prior to the rules of civil proce-
dure, as to the scope of the court's authority in determining the validity of a lien
and the validity and amount of a lien. It provides the following language, which,
at best, is superfluous:
[Tihe court shall, by itself or by a master to be appointed by it for that
purpose, proceed to ascertain the exact nature and amount of each claim
on the property or any part thereof, made by or belonging to any party to
the proceedings, the amount of which to be allowed and paid shall be com-
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Maine,10 5 among other states, have recognized that an action to
prove the amount of a mechanic's lien logically should not be
treated any differently in the civil-litigation system than in any
other in rem action. 10 6 So should Rhode Island.
A BONA-FIDE PURCHASER SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A LIEN.
Rhode Island has maintained a highly controversial and often
unfairly applied provision in its mechanic's lien law by permitting
the filings of mechanic's liens against the interests of a bona-fide
purchaser for value. In addition to being unfair, the statute is am-
biguous. Section 34-28-4 alludes to a forty-day rule within which
mechanic's liens against a bona-fide purchaser for value must be
filed. However, the statute does not provide direct confirmation for
that conclusion. The forty-day rule appears only in the language of
the existing notice of intention form; it does not appear in the text
of the statute.
The issue of fairness merits more substantive concern. Mak-
ing a bona-fide purchaser for value liable for claims is at odds with
the concept of holding the party who consents to the improvement
liable for its cost. The quandary faced by the court in Myles Fla-
herty is multiplied here. Not only is a bona-fide purchaser in no
reasonable position to have notice of potential claims under our
current statute, but the issue of consent, implied or expressed,
which apparently was critical to the holding in Myles Flaherty, is
largely irrelevant to liability. For these reasons, many states re-
ject the proposition that a bona-fide purchaser can be held liable
puted on the basis of the value of the property prior to the construction,
erection, alteration, or reparation which is the subject matter of the peti-
tion, and the order in which, in accordance with § 34-28-25 they should be
paid, and, in the event no payment has been made into the registry of the
court as provided in § 34-28-17, how much of the property, and especially
how much if any, and what portions of land under and adjoining the same,
subject to sale by the provisions of this chapter, should be sold to satisfy
the claims;...
R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-28-21.
104. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 254, § 5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
105. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 3255 (West 1997).
106. The recent amendments to Massachusetts law particularly provide a vehi-
cle through which additional notice can be provided where it is deemed advisable
by the court and the parties can appropriately litigate their differences in a man-
ner consistent with all other similar cases before the superior court. See Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 254, § 2 (West Supp. 1997).
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under a mechanic's lien for work provided prior to the date of
purchase.107 Such claims should fail by virtue of the absence of
implied or expressed consent or the inability of the purported lie-
nor to establish that the work has been performed at the instance
of the owner.' 08
In the residential context, it is virtually impossible for an
owner to be certain that no potential mechanic's lien claims accru-
ing prior to the date of purchase exist. While mechanics' lien affi-
davits and title insurance quell apprehension, the risk is not
eliminated. If, for some reason, the seller is unable to satisfy a
subsequent claim brought by virtue of the existence of a mechanic's
lien asserted after the purchase of real estate, then the bona-fide
purchaser may be ultimately liable to the lienor.
Although a party purchasing commercial property may pos-
sess a degree of sophistication and may have sufficient notice to be
alert for potential claims that could lurk after the sale, such is
rarely true for the residential purchaser. How, if at all, can a new
purchaser of a home protect him or herself from a lien asserted for
work which occurred two or three months before the closing date?
Repairs incidental to the sale of the real estate might not be easily
identified. Because of the obvious unfairness to a buyer of a resi-
dence, the General Assembly should cut off the lien rights against
a residential dwelling upon the date of sale. This would be consis-
tent with the manner in which the General Assembly has treated
other parties for whose labor liens may attach.'0 9
Finally, the General Assembly must eliminate the arcane and
politically incorrect language of the statute. Consider for example
107. Under the New York System, the limitation of the lien to the amount not
paid by the owner obviously precludes the bona-fide purchaser from liability. Colo-
rado and Indiana, which follow the Pennsylvania system, are examples of states
expressly protecting the bona-fide purchaser for value. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 38-22-125 (1997); Ind. Cod. Ann. § 32-8-3-1 (West 1979 and Supp. 1997).
108. See, e.g., C & W Elec., Inc. v. Casa Dorado Corp., 523 P.2d 137 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1974).
109. Compare R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 34-28-1 to -37 (Mechanics' Liens) with id.
§§ 34-30-1 to -3 (Jewelers', Watchmakers' and Silversmiths' Liens); id. §§ 34-33-1
to -2 (InnKeepers' Liens); id. § 34-24-1 (Federal Liens), and id. § 34-35-1 (Enforce-
ment of Common Law and Contractual Liens). This comparison reveals that the
General Assembly has not chosen to make a bona-fide purchaser liable for liens
incurred by the prior owner in any setting other than involving a construction
project.
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the existing language of sections 34-28-1(a), 34-28-2 and 34-28-3,
each of which provides:
Whenever any building, canal, turnpike, railroad, or other
improvement shall be constructed, erected, altered, or re-
paired by oral or written contract with or at the oral or writ-
ten request of the owner, the owner being at the time the
owner of the land on which the improvement is located, or by
the husband of such owner with the consent of his wife, the
building, canal, turnpike, railroad, or other improvement, to-
gether with the land, is hereby made liable and shall stand
subject to liens for all the work done by any person in the
construction, erection ....
Why is this language still part of our law?
Let us also recognize that a "mechanics'" lien is at best an in-
articulate description of the "construction" lien that our law is in-
tended to offer. 110
CONCLUSION
In certain states, concerns over unfairness have reached a
level at which the debate has turned to whether a lien should even
be allowed. Michigan, for example, underwent a debate in the late
1970s about a potential repeal of the construction lien. The oppo-
nents of mechanics' liens questioned why the real-estate construc-
tion field should be accorded legal rights not available generally
throughout commerce and industry."' In the end, Michigan
elected to retain its construction-lien law although the legislature
significantly changed the law to become more favorable to lenders
and owners, and in particular, homeowners.
One of the major features of the UCLA, the notice of com-
mencement, is similar to the notice of commencement utilized in
Massachusetts and other states. Rhode Island could easily employ
such a system with respect to remote subcontractors and suppliers
in the commercial setting and all subcontractors for residential
construction. With the owner and lender having a reasonable op-
110. Inasmuch as the protection of the statute has gone far beyond the interest
of the particular mechanic and now includes those who contribute to the construc-
tion process, most states have deleted the word "mechanic" and now use the term
.construction" when referring to the nature of the lien.
111. For discussion of the Michigan experience, see Benfleld, supra note 41, at
532-35.
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portunity to receive notice of a potential lien, the likelihood of
double payment and the quandary faced by the court in Myles Fla-
herty are less likely to occur.
The Rhode Island Mechanics' Lien Law has generally served
its purposes well since the General Assembly promulgated the cur-
rent version in 1847. It is time to recognize, however, that in the
150 years that have ensued, the language and processes of the lien
law have not followed the changes in our legal system. Although a
strong case could be made for a total rewrite of the Act including
major changes to many of its policies, the experience of the UCLA
suggests that such a rewrite would likely be unsuccessful and, in
the end, no significant changes would occur.
A statute which includes 340 words in one sentence, e.g., sec-
tion 34-28-4, is rife for misinterpretation. Likewise, a statute
which subjects a residential owner to payment for services pro-
vided by a vendor that could not reasonably have been discerned,
no matter the degree of care, is unfair. The Rhode Island statutes
cry out for revision. The Act should be simplified and clarified with
protection for all interests involved. The procedures in the end
should be readily comprehensible and uniform with general civil
litigation practices. 112
112. A proposed Rhode Island Construction Lien law follows.
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A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
TITLE 34. PROPERTY
CHAPTER 28. CONSTRUCTION LIENS
§ 34-28-1. Short Title.
This chapter may be cited as the "Rhode Island Construction
Lien Law."
§ 34-28-2. Definitions
(a) "Construction, erection, alteration or reparation" and "con-
structed, erected, altered or repaired," as used in this chapter,
means excavation and demolition preparatory to actual construc-
tion, erection, alteration, or reparation, except where used in the
phrase "actual and visible commencement, by excavation or other-
wise, of such construction, erection, alteration or reparation," in
§ 34-28-6, which phrase shall be construed to include the excava-
tion or otherwise, but not demolition.
(b) "Mortgage" as used in this chapter means construction
mortgages, so called, which are given to secure the payment of a
sum certain which is to be advanced at stated times or intervals.
(c) "Person" as used in this chapter means corporations, part-
nerships, or other organizations or entities, except that the words
"individual person" means only a natural person.
(d) "Materials" or "materials", when sued in this chapter,
shall, in addition to any meaning given through judicial interpreta-
tions or context, also include the rental or lease of any equipment.
(e) "Contractor" means a person in direct privity with the
owner or lessee, as the case may be.
(f) "Subcontractor" means a person in direct privity with a
Contractor.
(g) "Residential Structure" means an individual residential
condominium unit or a residential building that contains no more
than three residential units and land on which it is or will be lo-
cated, in which the owner or lessee contracting or requesting the
improvement is residing or will reside when the improvement is
completed.
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§ 34-28-3. Improvements by consent of owner.
Whenever any improvement to real property shall be con-
structed, erected, altered, or repaired by oral or written contract
with or at the oral or written request of the owner, the owner being
at the time the owner of the real property on which the improve-
ment is located, such improvement, together with the real prop-
erty, is hereby made liable and shall stand subject to liens for all
the work done by any person in the construction, erection, altera-
tion, or reparation of such improvement, and for the materials
used in the construction, erection, alteration, or reparation thereof,
which have been furnished by any person.
§ 34-28-4. Improvements by consent of tenant or lessee.
Whenever any improvement to real property shall be con-
structed, erected, altered, or repaired by oral or written contract
with or at the oral or written request of any lessee or tenant
thereof, the interest and title of the lessee or tenant in such im-
provement, and in the real property on which the improvement is
located, shall stand subject to liens for all the work done by any
person in the construction, erection, alteration, or reparation of
such improvement, and for the materials used in the construction,
erection, alteration, or reparation thereof, which have been fur-
nished by any person, but not the interest or title of the landlord of
such lessee or tenant, unless the consent in writing of the landlord
is first obtained, assenting to the construction, erection, alteration,
or reparation of such improvement.
§ 34-28-5. Improvements by consent of owner of less than
freehold.
Whenever any improvement to real property shall be con-
structed, erected, altered, or repaired by oral or written contract
with or at the oral or written request of the owner, the owner being
at the time less than sole owner of the fee simple (including, with-
out restricting the foregoing, a life tenant, tenant in common, joint
tenant, and tenant by entirety), such improvement, together with
the title and interest of the owner in the real property on which the
improvement is located, shall stand subject to liens for all the work
done by any person in the construction, erection, alteration, or rep-
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aration of such improvement, and for the materials used in the
construction, erection, or reparation thereof, which have been fur-
nished by any person, but not the interest or title of any owner of
an estate in such real property, unless the consent in writing of the
other owner is first obtained, assenting to the construction, erec-
tion, alteration, or reparation. In the case of a tenancy by entirety,
no lien shall be had unless both husband and wife have contracted
for or requested such improvement.
§ 34-28-6. Lien of architect or engineer.
The lien, under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4 or 34-28-5, of any architect
or engineer for work done in connection with the construction,
erection, alteration, or reparation, the result of which is used
therein, shall be valid and enforceable under the provisions of this
chapter if and only if a notice of lien provided for in § 34-28-10, is
mailed and filed in accordance therewith by the architect or engi-
neer, the mailing and filing in the land evidence records to be
before the later of one hundred twenty (120) days of the perform-
ance of the work or ten (10) days after the actual and visible com-
mencement, by excavation or otherwise, of the construction,
erection, alteration or reparation.
§34-28-7. Notice to owner of residential structure.
If a person who is not a contractor claims a lien under §§ 34-
28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5, or 34-28-6 in connection with work per-
formed and materials furnished to a residential structure, the lien
may only be enforced against the real property and improvements
thereon to the extent of the balance due from the owner to the con-
tractor or to the subcontractor in privity with the person claiming
the lien unless that person asserting the lien has, within thirty
(30) days of commencement of his performance of his work or fur-
nishing of his materials provided a notice of intention meeting the
requirements of § 34-28-9 to the owner, or lessee, as the case may
be, either by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by filing in
the office of land evidence records for the city or town within which
the real property is located.
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§ 34-28-8. Remote subcontractors and suppliers.
If the person claiming a lien under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, and 34-
28-5 and 34-28-6 is neither a contractor nor a subcontractor, the
amount of the lien shall not exceed the amount due or to become
due under the agreement between the contractor and the subcon-
tractor whose work includes the work of the person claiming the
lien as of the date such person files the notice of lien under § 34-28-
10, unless the person claiming such lien has, within thirty days of
commencement of performance of his or her work or furnishing of
his materials, provided a notice of intention meeting the require-
ments of § 34-28-9, providing notice to the owner, either by certi-
fied mail, return receipt requested or by filing the notice of
intention in the office of land evidence records for the city or town
within which the real property is located.
§ 34-28-9. Notice of intention to perform work, to furnish,
materials or both.
(a) A notice of intention to perform work, furnish materials or
both, required by §§ 34-28-7 and 34-28-8 shall be executed under
oath and contain the following information:
(1) The name of the owner of record of the land at the time of
the mailing, or in the case of any lessee or tenant, the name of the
lessee or tenant, and the mailing address of the owner or lessee,
the name and address to be located at the upper left hand corner of
the notice, in addition to the text of the notice;
(2) A general description of the land sufficient to identify it
with reasonable certainty, including, for example only, street name
and number, if available;
(3) A general description of the nature of the work done or to
be done, or of the materials to be furnished, or both, and the ap-
proximate value, if known;
(4) The name and address of the person or persons for whom
directly the work is to be done, or to whom directly the materials
are to be furnished;
(5) The name and address of the person mailing the notice;
(b) The notice of intention may be in substantially the follow-
ing form:
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(Name of owner of record/Lessee)
(Address of owner/Lessee)
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO DO WORK OR FURNISH
MATERIALS, OR BOTH
All persons are hereby notified that the undersigned intends to
do work or furnish materials or both, in the construction, erection,
alteration, or preparation of an improvement on land described as
follows: [here insert description] and that the land is owned by or
leased to [here insert name of owner or lessee or tenant]. The na-
ture of the work or materials furnished is as follows: [here insert
general description of the nature of the work or materials, or both]
and is being done for or furnished to [here insert name of person or
persons for whom directly the work is being done or to whom di-
rectly the materials are being furnished], whose address is [here
insert address].
The approximate value of said work or materials is, $
[Name and address of person
filing notice]
NOTARIZATION CLAUSE
Signed and sworn before me this day of
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
§34-28-10. Notice of lien.
(a) Any and all liens claimed or that could be claimed under
§§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5, or 34-28-6 shall be void and wholly
lost to any person claiming under those sections unless the person
shall, before or within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the
doing of such work or the furnishing of such materials, mail by
prepaid registered or certified mail, in either case return receipt
requested, a notice of lien, executed under oath and containing the
following information:
(1) The name of the owner of record of the land at the time of
the mailing, or in the case of a lien against the interest of any
lessee or tenant, the name of the lessee or tenant, and the mailing
address of the owner or lessee, the name and address to be located
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at the upper left hand corner of the notice, in addition to the text of
the notice, as described in subsection (b);
(2) A general description of the land sufficient to identify it
with reasonable certainty, including, for example only, street name
and number, if available;
(3) A general description of the nature of the work done, or of
the materials furnished, or both, and the approximate value of the
money claimed for such work done or materials furnished, or both,
as of the date of the notice;
(4) The name and address of the person or persons for whom
directly the work has been done or is to be done, or to whom di-
rectly the materials have been furnished or are to be furnished;
(5) The name and address of the person mailing the notice and
the name of the individual person or persons whose signature will
bind the person so mailing on all matters pertaining to the notice
or any lien claimed thereunder, or release thereof;
(6) A statement that the person mailing the notice has not
been paid for the work done or materials furnished or both; and
(7) A statement that the filing in the land evidence records of
a copy of the notice of lien together with the notice to the owner
will perfect a lien against the owner's real property.
(b) The notice may be in substantially the following form:
(Name of owner of record/Lessee)
(Address of owner/Lessee)
NOTICE OF LIEN
All persons are hereby notified that the undersigned has
within the one hundred and twenty (120) days prior to the mailing
hereof done work, furnished materials, or both, in the construction,
erection, alteration, or preparation of an improvement on land de-
scribed as follows: [here insert description] and that the land is
owned by or leased to [here insert name of owner or lessee or ten-
ant]. The nature of the work done or materials furnished is as fol-
lows: [here insert general description of the nature of the work or
materials, or both] and was done for or furnished to [here insert
name of person or persons for whom directly the work is being done
or to whom directly the materials are being furnished], whose ad-
dress is [here insert address].
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The approximate value of said work or materials is, as of the
date of the notice, $ , and the undersigned has not been paid for
the work or materials or both;
The undersigned authorizes [here insert name or names] to
act or sign documents in behalf of the undersigned in all matters
pertaining to this notice, or any lien claimed hereunder, or release
thereof.
You are hereby informed that the filing in the records of land
evidence of the city or town of [here insert name of city or town] of
a copy of this notice of lien, together with this mailing, will perfect
a lien against the land described herein, under the subject to the
provisions of the Rhode Island Construction Lien Law.
[Name and address of person
filing notice]
NOTARIZATION CLAUSE
Signed and sworn before me this - day of
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
(c) If the person claiming a lien is subject to filing and/or serv-
ing a notice of intention to do work and/or furnish materials, or
both, as required by §§ 34-28-7 or 34-28-8, a copy of such notice
indicating proof and date of filing and service shall be provided to
the owner or lessee with the notice of lien.
(d) Within three (3) days of mailing a copy of the notice of lien
to the owner, a person claiming a lien must file a copy of such no-
tice in the records of land evidence in the city or town in which the
land described in the notice of lien is located.
(e) The notice of lien shall be mailed to the owner of record of
the land at the time of the mailing, or, in the case of a lien against
the interest of any lessee or tenant, to the lessee or tenant, the
mailing to be addressed to the last known residence or place of
business of the owner or lessee or tenant, but if no residence or
place of business is known or ascertainable by the person making
the mailing, by inquiry of the person with whom the person mak-
ing the mailing is directly dealing or otherwise, then the mailing
under this section shall be to the address of the land.
(f) The mailing of the notice of lien and the filing of the copy in
the land evidence records together with the mailing of another
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copy thereof as hereinbelow provided shall perfect, subject to other
sections of this chapter, the lien of the person so mailing and filing
as to work done or materials furnished by the person during the
one hundred and twenty (120) days prior to the mailing and there-
after, but not as to work done or materials furnished by the person
before the one hundred and twenty (120) days prior to the mailing,
any lien for which shall be void and wholly lost.
(g) In the event that the notice of lien, having been mailed,
shall be returned to the person mailing the notice, not having been
delivered for any reason, the lien of the person so mailing shall be
void and wholly lost, notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, unless such person shall, within thirty (30) days after the
return of the notice of lien, and in no event more than one hundred
twenty (120) days after the mailing of the notice, file the notice
together with the envelope in which the notice was returned, in the
place and manner and with the consequences hereinbefore pro-
vided for the filing of a copy of the notice of intention, and the filing
shall be in lieu of any fling required at any other time under this
section.
§ 34-28-11. Contracts barring notices of intention or notice
of lien barred as against public policy-filing of
notice of intention no grounds for mortgagee to
withhold funding.
(a) A covenant, promise, agreement of understanding in, or in
connection with or collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to
the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building,
structure, appurtenance and appliance, including moving, demoli-
tion and excavating connected therewith, purporting to bar the fil-
ing of a notice of intention or notice of lien or the taking of any
steps to enforce a lien as set forth in this chapter is against public
policy and is void and unenforceable. This section shall not pre-
clude a requirement for a written waiver of the right to file a con-
struction lien executed and delivered by a contractor,
subcontractor, material supplier, or laborer simultaneously with or
after payment for the labor performed or the materials furnished
has been made to such contractor, subcontractor, material sup-
plier, or laborer.
(b) The filing or recording of a notice of intention as provided
in § 34-28-9 shall not itself be grounds for a mortgagee to withhold
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sums for the funding, financing or payment for performing work or
furnishing materials or both for which any such notice or state-
ment is filed or recorded or to require dissolution of such notice or
statement before providing further funding, financing or pay-
ments, and any covenant, promise, agreement or understanding
relative to the improvement or alteration to real property to with-
hold such funding, financing or payment or to require dissolution
of such notice or statement before providing further funding, fi-
nancing or payments solely on that ground is against public policy
and void and unenforceable; provided, however, that nothing con-
tained in this chapter shall obligate a mortgagee to disburse sums
for the funding, financing or payment for the work or materials or
both for which any such notice or statement is filed or recorded
unless such mortgagee has received an accurately completed and
valid partial waiver and subordination of lien in the form set forth
substantially as follows from the person who filed or recorded such
notice of intention:
PARTIAL WAIVER AND SUBORDINATION OF LIEN





1. Original Contract Amount: $_
2. Approved Change Orders: $
3. Adjusted Contract Amount: $
(line 1 plus 2)
4. Completed to Date: $
5. Less Retainage: $
6. Total Payable to Date: $
(line 4 less line 5)
7. Less Previous Payments: $
8. Current Amount Due: $
(line 6 less line 7)
9. Pending Change Orders: $
10. Disputed Claims: $
The undersigned who has a contract with
for performing work or furnishing materials or both for the
construction, erection, alteration or repair of an improvement of
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real property known and identified as located in
(city or town), Rhode Island and owned by
upon receipt of ($ ) in
payment of an invoice/requisition/application for payment dated
_ _ does hereby:
(a) waive any and all liens and right of lien on such real
property for labor or materials, or both labor and materials, or
rental equipment, appliances or tools, performed or furnished
through the following date: (payment period),
except for retainage, unpaid agreed or pending change orders, and
disputed claims as stated above; and
(b) subordinate any and all liens and right of lien to secure
payment for such unpaid, agreed or pending change orders and
disputed claims, and such further work or materials, or both work
and materials, for retainage, performed or furnished at any time
through the date of the above payment period, to the extent of the
amount actually advanced by the above lender/mortgagee through
such date.
[Signature of person signing
waiver]
Signed and sworn before me this - day of_ _ .
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
§ 34-28-12. Recording notice of intention.
Every town clerk and every recorder of deeds, as the case may
be, shall, on payment of a fee of eight dollars ($8.00) for each notice
of intention provided for in § 34-28-9, and notice of lien provided
for in § 34-28-10, record the notice whether in the form therein pro-
vided or not, in a book to be kept by him or her for that purpose,
with the time and date when the notices of intention and notices of
lien are received and recorded by him or her; he or she shall also
maintain an alphabetical index of the owners and lessees or ten-
ants mentioned in all notices of intention and notices of lien, so
recorded, provided, however, that the town clerk may refuse for
recording any notice of intention or notice of lien which fails to ref-
erence the name of the owner of record, or lessee.
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§ 34-28-13. Land subject to lien.
A notice of lien may be mailed and filed under § 34-28-10
against one or more contiguous parcels of land or parcels of land
separated only by a public or private way, provided such parcels
are owned, or occupied as lessee or tenant, by the same person or
persons, and in such case the lien under the provisions of §§ 34-28-
3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6 shall be against all of the parcels of
land and all of the improvements thereon in accordance with the
tenor of those sections, or against the interest of the lessee or ten-
ant therein, if the work is done or the materials are used on any of
the parcels, or in any of the improvements.
§ 34-28-14. Effective period of notice of lien.
A notice of lien filed under § 34-28-10 shall cover all work done
or materials furnished, or both, within its terms, and shall be effec-
tive only for one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of filing.
§ 34-28-15. Civil action to enforce lien-lis pendens notice.
(a) Any and all liens under the provisions of §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-
4, 34-28-5, or 34-28-6 shall be void and wholly lost to any person
claiming a lien under those sections, unless the person shall file a
civil action to enforce the lien in the superior court for the county
in which is situated the land upon which the improvement has
been constructed, erected, altered, or repaired, and unless such
person shall also file in the records of land evidence in the city or
town in which such land is located a notice of lis pendens, de-
scribed in § 34-28-16, the civil action to be filed on the same day as
the notice of lis pendens, or within seven (7) days thereafter, and
both the civil action and the notice of lis pendens to be filed within
one hundred twenty (120) days of the date of the recording of the
notice of lien provided in § 34-28-10. The lien of any person under
§§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6 who fails to file a civil action
and notice of lis pendens under this section within the required one
hundred twenty (120) day period, shall be void and wholly lost as
to work done or materials furnished prior to the one hundred
twenty (120) day period, regardless of the fact that the person may
thereafter do other work or furnish other materials in the course of
the same construction, erection, alteration, or reparation.
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(b) The power of sale contained in a mortgage on any real
property subject to a lien created by this chapter shall not be af-
fected by the filing of a notice of lien as provided in § 34-28-10,
provided, however, the power of sale shall be suspended by the fil-
ing of a civil action to enforce as provided in this section and the
power of sale shall only be exercised thereafter in accordance with
the provisions of § 34-28-18.
§ 34-28-16. Contents of lis pendens.
(a) The notice of lis pendens required to be filed under § 34-28-
15 shall state that the person filing the notice of lis pendens that
day has filed or will file within seven (7) days in the superior court
a civil action to enforce a construction lien, and shall also contain:
(1) The name of the person against whom the civil action has
been or will be filed and the relationship of the person to the real
property which the improvement has been constructed, erected, al-
tered or repaired;
(2) A description of the land by metes and bounds, or by refer-
ence to a recorded plat, by tax assessor's lot and plat, or by other
legal description:
(3) The amount claimed in the civil action to be due;
(4) The dates of the mailing and of filing of any notice of inten-
tion under § 34-28-9 and notices of lien under § 34-28-10, and the
name and address of the person to whom any mailing under § 34-
28-10 was made:
(5) The name and address of the plaintiff and of his or her at-
torney, if any.
(b) The notice of lis pendens may be in substantially the fol-
lowing form:
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
All persons are hereby notified that the undersigned this day
had filed or will file within seven (7) days hereafter, in the superior
court for - County, a civil action to enforce a construction
lien against [here insert name of the person against whom the civil
action has been or will be filed and his or her relationship to the
real property], concerning land described as follows: [here insert
description of land]. The undersigned asserts that there is due to
him or her the sum of [here insert the amount claimed] under a
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construction lien, which is based upon a notice of lien under § 34-
28-10- of the construction lien law, mailed to [here insert name and
address of person to whom mailing was made] on [here insert date
of mailing] and filed in the records of land evidence of the city or
town of [here insert name of city or town] on [here insert date of
filing of notice]. The attorney for the undersigned is [here insert
name and address of attorney].
[Name and address of person filing notice of lis pendens]
§34-28-17. Form and prosecution of civil action to enforce
lien.
(a) The plaintiff shall bring the civil action in his or her own
behalf and shall name as defendants the owner and all persons,
including any other person asserting a lien under this chapter,
having any interest of record in the real property, or with respect
to liens asserted pursuant to §§ 34-28-4 and 34-28-5, an interest in
the leasehold or of a less than freehold interest of the owner, as the
case may be. The complaint shall contain a brief description of the
property sufficient to identify it, a statement of the amount due,
and a brief explanation of the basis under which the claim is
asserted.
(b) All parties having an interest in the real property may ap-
pear and have their rights determined in the civil action, and at
any time before entry of final judgment, upon the suggestion of any
party in interest that any other person is or may be interested in
the action, or of its own motion, the court may summon such per-
son to appear in such cause on or before a day certain or be forever
barred from any rights thereunder. The court may in its discretion
provide for notice to absent parties in interest. The term "party in
interest" shall include mortgagees and attaching creditors.
(c) The commencement and prosecution of the civil action to
enforce the construction lien shall be governed by the rules of civil
procedure in a non-jury proceeding.
§ 34-28-18. Petition to foreclose mortgage.
At any time after the filing of a civil action under § 34-28-15,
the holder of a mortgage having a priority over liens existing under
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§§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6 may petition the court to
exercise the power of sale contained in the mortgage and the court
shall grant the petition to foreclose, after notice to all interested
parties and hearing thereon, upon a showing by the mortgagee
that the mortgage is valid, entitled to priority and is in default,
except for a default arising from the filing of a civil action to en-
force pursuant to § 34-28-15.
§ 34-28-19. Dismissal of civil action, notice of lien, and re-
lease of lien upon deposit in court.
At any time after the recording of a notice of lien or after the
filing of a civil action to enforce a lien under § 34-28-15, and upon
providing notice to the person or persons claiming the lien and ap-
proval by the superior court, the owner or lessee or tenant of the
land described in the notice or petition may pay into the registry of
the court in the county in which the land is located cash equal to
the total amount of the notice of lien and all claims of person as-
serting liens therein under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6,
including costs of the lien holder, or may, in lieu of cash, deposit in
the registry of the court the bond of a surety company licensed to
do business in this state in the total amount running to all persons
claiming liens under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 and 34-28-6, and
on proper proof of payment or deposit the superior court shall enter
an order discharging the notice of lien and lis pendens and dis-
missing the cause as to the owner or lessee or tenant and as to all
persons having any title, claim, lease, mortgage, attachment or
other lien or encumbrance (other than under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4,
34-28-5 or 34-28-6), and on the entry of the order, the improvement
is being or has been constructed, erected, altered, or repaired shall
be released and discharged from the notices of lien, but the rights
of all persons having any title, claim, lease, mortgage, attachment
or other lien or encumbrance (other than under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-
4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6) shall be the same as if no notices of lien
under § 34-28-10 had been mailed or filed and as if no petition
under § 34-28-15 had been filed. In the event that a payment is
made into the registry of court in accordance with this section, any
person, having a contract directly with the person making the pay-
ment, may be permitted, after notice to all parties under the peti-
tion and after hearing in open court, to withdraw from the registry
of court the sum of money due to him or her under the contract,
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provided that the person making the withdrawal first furnish a
bond, payable to the clerk of court, with good and sufficient corpo-
rate surety, for the repayment of the amount, or as much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy claims thereinafter allowed by the
court.
§ 34-28-20. Costs of proceedings.
The costs of the proceedings shall in every instance be within
the discretion of the court as between any of the parties. Costs
shall include legal interest, and all other reasonable expenses of
proceeding with the civil action and the enforcement of the action.
The court, in its discretion, may also allow for the award of attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party.
§ 34-28-21. Decree ordering sale.
(a) When the amount of any lien under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4,
34-28-5 and 34-28-6 has been established, the court may enter an
order authorizing the sale of the real property to satisfy the lien.
In so ordering the court may issue such instructions, restrictions
and conditions as, in its discretion, it deems appropriate. The
court may appoint a master to conduct the sale of the real
property.
(b) In every decree of sale the court shall prescribe the notice
that shall be given of the sale and shall also give therein instruc-
tions and particular directions as each case may require, and upon
application to the court, at any time, further instructions and di-
rections may be given from time to time in relation thereto.
§ 34-28-22. Application of proceeds of sale.
The proceeds of the sale, after payment of costs and expenses
of sale as shall be allowed by the court, shall be applied to the pay-
ment of the claims as marshaled and ascertained, and the balance,
if any, which shall remain after payment thereof, shall be paid
over to the owner or the lessee or tenant of the property, as the
case may be.
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§ 34-28-23. Master's bond.
The court may, in its discretion, require of a master bond or
bonds with surety or sureties in such sum and to the person or
persons as it may direct, securing the faithful application of the
proceeds of sale, and may from time to time remove the master on
account of any noncompliance with its order or decree, and appoint
a new master in his or her stead.
§ 34-28-24. Priority of liens.
(a) The priority of liens under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 and
34-28-6 shall be as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subdivision (a)(3), as between per-
sons having valid liens under this chapter, all of the lien holders
shall share pro rata in the distribution of funds received by deposit
under § 34-28-19 or of the proceeds of any sale under § 34-28-21,
based on the court's determination of the amount of their liens and
costs of proceeding.
(2) Except as provided in subdivision (1), the priority of per-
sons mailing and filing notices of intention under § 34-28-10 shall
date from the date of the filing; the lien of the persons shall be
senior to any subsequently recorded title, claim, lease, mortgage,
attachment, or other lien or encumbrance (other than under §§ 34-
28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6), and the lien of such persons
shall be junior to any prior recorded title, claim, lease, mortgage,
attachment, or other lien or encumbrance (other than under §§ 34-
28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6). Any person having an existing
lien under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6 subject to any
prior recorded mortgage, attachment, or other lien or encumbrance
may pay off the prior mortgage, attachment, or other lien or en-
cumbrance and shall be subrogated to all of the rights of the holder
of the prior mortgage, attachment, or other lien or encumbrance.
(3) In the event that there shall be recorded any title, claim,
lease, mortgage, attachment, or other lien or encumbrance (other
than under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6) junior to any
liens under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6 or in accordance
with subdivision (2) and senior to other liens, then the liens under
§§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6 senior to the title, claim,
lease, mortgage, attachment, or other lien or encumbrance shall be
separated from the liens junior to the lien or encumbrance, and the
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senior liens shall be senior to the title, claim, lease, mortgage, at-
tachment, or other lien or encumbrance, and the junior liens shall
be junior thereto.
(b) Priority between persons whose claims are not specifically
provided for in this section shall be determined by the court or
master in accordance with equity and good conscience.
§ 34-28-25. Subordination or release of lien.
Any subordination agreement or release, bearing the signa-
ture of any person with authority to sign the agreement or release,
or of the person who is designated in a notice of intention under
§§ 34-28-10 as the person whose signature will bind the person fil-
ing the notice, which purports to subordinate or release any lien
under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6 whether for work
done or materials furnished prior to the agreement or release, or
thereafter, or both, notwithstanding the fact that no consideration
is given therefor, shall be enforceable according to its terms, by any
other person who has changed his or her position in any way in
reliance upon the subordination agreement or release, whether the
other person is otherwise obligated to make the change of position
or not.
§ 34-28-26. Direct payment on release of lien.
Any person entitled to any lien under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-
28-5 or 34-28-6 who releases the lien before receiving payment for
the work done or materials furnished forming the basis of the lien,
shall be entitled to demand and receive direct payment therefor
from the owner or lessee or tenant or other person as may be obli-
gated or permitted to make the payment on behalf of the owner or
lessee or tenant, provided that the person entitled to the lien first
obtains the written consent of all persons in line of privity between
him or her and the owner or other person; on presentation of a
proper demand for the payment, the owner or lessee or tenant or
other person shall, if satisfied as to the amount thereof, make pay-
ment, on proper receipt therefor, and credit shall be given therefor
by all persons in line of privity between the owner or other person
and the person releasing the lien.
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§ 34-28-27. Damages on withholding direct payment of con-
sent thereto.
No person in the line of privity referred to in § 34-28-26 shall
unreasonably withhold his or her written consent to a direct pay-
ment, nor shall any owner or lessee or tenant or other person re-
ferred to in § 34-28-28 unreasonably withhold a direct payment,
and, if the person or owner or lessee or tenant or other person shall
unreasonably withhold consent therefor or payment thereof, he or
she shall be liable for any damages as may accrue as the natural
and probable consequences thereof.
§ 34-28-28. Form of demand for direct payment.
A demand for direct payment under § 34-28-26 shall be suffi-
cient in substantially the following form:
DEMAND FOR DIRECT PAYMENT
To: [here insert name of owner or lessee or tenant, or of other
person as may be obligated or permitted to make payments on be-
half of the owner or lessee or tenant]. The undersigned hereby re-
leases his or her lien against [here describe the improvement and
the land on which it is situated, which description shall be suffi-
cient to identify it generally with reasonable certainty] owned by or
leased to [here insert name of owner or lessee] for work done or
materials furnished by the undersigned, as follows:
[here insert a general description of the work done or materi-
als furnished, with amounts and dates the work was
performed].
The undersigned had taken the following steps to perfect the
lien:
[here insert the steps take to perfect the lien under this
chapter].
the persons in line of privity between you and the undersigned
are as follows:
[here insert names of all persons in line of privity].
Each of the persons has endorsed his or her approval to this
demand.
Wherefore, the undersigned demands payment from you of the
sum of [here insert amount].
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[here insert signature and address of person making demand]
Approved:
[here insert signatures of persons in line of privityl
Payment received
[for signature of person demanding payment, when he or she
has received the same]
§34-28-29. Suit on bond to secure payment.
If any bond is given to secure payment for work done or mater-
ials furnished on account of the construction, erection, alteration or
reparation of improvement or on account of any contract between
the owner or lessee or tenant of the land on which the improve-
ment is or shall be constructed, erected, altered, or repaired and
any other person, the bond shall enure to the benefit of any person
who does any work in the construction, erection, alteration, or rep-
aration thereof, or who furnishes any materials used for that pur-
pose, and the person doing the work or furnishing the materials
may bring suit in his or her own name on the bond against any
party thereto, notwithstanding the fact that no notice of lien under
§ 34-28-10 has been mailed or filed, and, further, notwithstanding
the fact that he or she is not a party to the bond or to the contract
between the owner or lessee or tenant and other person, and, fur-
ther, notwithstanding, the fact that he or she did not know of or
rely on the bond or give any notice to the surety on the bond, and
further, notwithstanding the fact that he or she did work or fur-
nished materials for use on any subcontract, mediate or immedi-
ate, to such contract between the owner or lessee or tenant and the
other person.
§ 34-28-30. Application to governmental agencies.
No lien under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5 or 34-28-6 shall at-
tach to any improvement, if the improvement is being constructed,
erected, altered, or repaired by or for the state, or any city or town,
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or any subdivision or agency thereof, or to any land upon which the
improvement exists, if the land is owned by the state or any city or
town, or any subdivision or agency thereof, but the provisions of
§§ 34-28-29 shall apply to improvements being so constructed, er-
ected, altered, or repaired.
§ 34-28-31. Contractor excused from completing work upon
filing of petition.
From and after the filing of any civil action under § 34-28-15,
any person furnishing work or materials, or both who shall not
have fully completed his or her contract in relation to the erection,
construction, alteration, or reparation thereof, shall thereafter be
excused from completing the contract, unless unreasonable con-
duct by such person has contributed materially to the facts giving
rise to the nonpayment resulting in the commencement of the civil
action.
§ 34-28-32. Construction.
This chapter is intended to afford a liberal remedy to all who
have contributed labor, material, or equipment towards adding to
the value of property to which the lien attaches and should be con-
strued accordingly.
§ 34-28-33. Remedy of chapter not exclusive.
Except as otherwise specified, nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to limit the right of any person, whether he or she have a
valid lien hereunder or not, to remedies otherwise available to him
or her under law; and the rights, if any, of any person against any
other person (rather than against the property which is the subject
matter of any petition under this chapter) shall not be impaired by
the provisions of this chapter.
§ 34-28-34. Bona fide purchaser.
Any person who is a bona fide purchaser for value of an owner-
ship or interest leasehold in a residential structure which would
otherwise be subject to a lien under §§ 34-28-3, 34-28-4, 34-28-5, or
34-28-6, takes title to such interest free of any such lien unless,
before the bona fide purchaser takes title to the real property or
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leasehold interest, on which the lien would attach, the person per-
forming work, or furnishing materials, or both, has filed a notice of
intention to do work and/or furnish materials as provided by § 34-
28-9, or has filed a notice of lien as provided by § 34-28-10.
§ 34-28-35. Severability.
If any part or parts of this chapter shall be held to be unconsti-
tutional, that unconstitutionality shall not affect the validity of the
remaining parts of this chapter. The general assembly hereby de-
clares that it would have enacted the remaining parts of this chap-
ter if it had known that the part or parts thereof would be declared
unconstitutional.
§ 34-28-36. Form of real estate description.
Whenever any description of real estate is required under the
provisions of this chapter, it shall be deemed sufficient to describe
the real estate by metes and bounds description and street ad-
dress, or by recitation of the taxing authority's assessor's plat and
lot designation and street address, or by recitation of the book and
page of mortgage and street address.
